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POSTREVOCATION USE: AN IMPERMISSIBLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE UCC
Economic exigencies often force buyers, especially consumers, to use defective
goods after revocation of acceptance until a substitute becomes available. Some
courts have held such a revocation effective despite buyers' continued use of the good&
This Note argues, however, that permitting revocation after use violates the Uniform
Commercial Code and gives buyers a gratuitous remedy. Section 2-714, which allows
damages for breach of contract, adequately compensates aggrieved buyers who are
forced to use defective goods after revocation. Thus, courts should apply a no-use-
after-revocation rule; continued use of goods after revocation should invalidate the
revocation and injured buyers should resort to their damage remedy.
INTRODUCTION
ARTICLE 2 OF the Uniform Commercial Code' (UCC or Code)provides relief for a buyer who has accepted2 nonconforming3
goods and wants to escape the bargain. Under section 2-608 of the
Code, such a buyer may revoke his acceptance when certain condi-
tions are met and recover both the purchase price and damages for
breach.4 To exercise his right of revocation after acceptance, the
buyer gives the seller notice of the revocation.5 The buyer is then
1. Except for Louisiana, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted arti-
cle 2 of the UCC. See lA U.L.A. ix (1976 & Supp. 1984) for the statutory citations and
effective dates.
2. Acceptance, in the sale of goods context of article 2, means "that the buyer, pursu-
ant to the contract, takes particular goods which have been appropriated to the contract as
his own." U.C.C. § 2-606 comment 1 (1977).
3. The Code defines conforming: "Goods or conduct including any part of a perform-
ance are 'conforming' or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obli-
gations under the contract." Id. § 2-106(2). See also id. § 2-106 comment 2 (the Code
intends, with some limitations, to require "exact performance by the seller").
4. Section 2-608 reads in full:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it
has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is
not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
5. Revocation "is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it." Id. § 2-608(2).
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faced with the question whether he may continue to use the goods
after revoking his acceptance without invalidating his revocation.
The rescission doctrine, the common-law predecessor of the
Code's revocation of acceptance provisions,6 forbade continued use
of the goods by the buyer. Rescission operated as a complete un-
making of the contract 7 and constituted an election by the re-
scinding party not to seek damages on the contract.' The
rescinding buyer was required to return, or offer to return, the
goods he had received under the contract.9 Since the theory under-
lying the remedy was to return the parties to their preagreement
status,"0 the buyer's continued use of the goods usually invalidated
his rescission.11 The inclusion of the remedy of revocation of ac-
ceptance in the Code signifies a departure from the rescission doc-
trine. The Code drafters made it clear in comment 1 to section 2-
608 that revocation of acceptance is a new remedy designed to en-
able the buyer to return the goods, recover the purchase price, and,
unlike rescission, recover consequential and incidental damages.12
Unfortunately, the drafters did not explicitly state whether the
buyer had a right to continue to use the goods after revocation if the
seller refused to take them back, or whether such use destroyed the
revocation of acceptance. In resolving this problem, courts have
6. See Lawner v. Engelbach, 433 Pa. 311, 315, 249 A.2d 295, 297 (1969) ("[Ihe Uni-
form Commercial Code has largely abandoned the concept of 'rescission' in favor of the con-
cept of 'revocation of acceptance.' ").
7. 2 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, WILLisTON ON SALES § 12-7, at 24 (4th ed. 1974).
8. Sylvania Indus. Corp. v. Lilienfeld's Estate, 132 F.2d 887, 893 (4th Cir. 1943); 17
AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 516 (1964).
9. Village of Wells v. Layne-Minnesota Co., 240 Minn. 132, 138, 60 N.W.2d 621, 625
(1953); Ray v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 92 N.J. Super. 519, 539, 224 A.2d 143, 154 (1966); 17 AM.
JUR. 2D Contracts § 512 (1964).
10. Eg., Don McCullagh, Inc. v. Dimitroff, 327 Mich. 656, 42 N.W.2d 775 (1950);
Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952). Contra Pfaudler Co.
v. American Beef Packing Co., 338 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (particulars of the case
must be evaluated in determining whether buyer's use after he notifies seller of his rejection of
the goods is a waiver of rescission).
11. "[he duty to render the return performance is revived if the injured party exercises
acts of ownership over the property." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 401 (1932) (super-
seded 1979). This contractual rule has substantially softened: "The availability of other
forms of equitable relief, such as a decree. . . for rescission or cancellation may also be
considered in choosing the remedy best suited to the circumstances of the case." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 comment c (1979).
12. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1 reads in pertinent part: "[Tihe buyer is no longer re-
quired to elect between revocation of acceptance and recovery of damages for breach. Both
are now available to him. The non-alternative character of the two remedies is stressed by the
terms used in the present section. The section no longer speaks of 'rescission'...."
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employed drastically different analyses and have reached opposite
conclusions.
While postrevocation use problems have arisen in a business
context, 13 they most frequently arise in consumer cases, apparently
because many consumers cannot afford to store or replace the defec-
tive good while awaiting the outcome of a lawsuit against the
seller.14
In the last fifteen years, several courts have focused on the diffi-
culties that attempted revocation of acceptance presents to buyers,
especially those involved in consumer transactions. 5 These courts
have attempted to help buyers by rationalizing postrevocation use.
In doing so they have imposed the burden of this use on the seller,
thereby expanding the remedy of revocation of acceptance.
Although these decisions have received a generally favorable re-
sponse from legal scholars,16 they have ignored the Code's dic-
tates, 1 7 encountered serious problems in awarding an offset to the
seller for the buyer's continued use,' and forgotten about the alter-
native remedy of damages for breach of contract which is available
to the buyer once he has used the goods.19
This Note first examines the Code sections governing the
buyer's continued use of goods after revocation of acceptance.20
Next, it describes the various Code interpretations courts have em-
ployed to reject 21 or allow 22 postrevocation use and the typical con-
13. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
14. See, eg., Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center, Inc., 32 Mich. App. 10, 188
N.W.2d 9 (1971) (plaintiffs "encountered considerable difficulty in finding another place to
live" and consequently continued to live in their mobile home after revoking their acceptance
of it); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiffs
continued to use their revoked car after two months in storage because of the "inconvenience
and prohibitive cost of other transportation").
15. Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Return Unsatisfactory Goods--The Uniform Commer-
cial Code Remedies of Rejection and Revocation of Acceptance, 20 WASHBURN LJ. 20, 37
(1980).
16. See id.; Highsmith & Havens, Revocation of Acceptance and the Defective Automo-
bile: The Uniform Commercial Code to the Rescue, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 303, 317 (1980); Note,
Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revocation ofAcceptance Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1371, 1381 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Buyer's Contin-
ued Use]; Note, Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Attempted Revocation of Acceptance
Does Not Bar Such Revocation As Matter of Law, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 763, 772 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Revocation Not Barred]. But see Solove, Revocation of Acceptance
in Ohio: New Powerfor the Automobile Purchaser, 56 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 1288, 1291 (1983).
17. See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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sumer-buyer's plight that motivates some courts to allow such
use.23 This Note then advocates a no-use-after-revocation rule,
based on two arguments. First, analysis of the relevant Code sec-
tions suggests that the drafters intended to create such a rule.24
Second, the problems courts face in awarding a seller an offset for
the buyer's continued use demonstrate the need for a no-use rule.25
This Note concludes that the damage remedy for a seller's breach in
section 2-714 effectively allows the buyer to recover the benefit of
his bargain when he has used the goods after revocation.26
I. POSTREVOCATION USE: THE CODE AND THE COURTS'
VARIED RESPONSES
A. Buyer's Continued Use of Defective Goods Prohibited
The UCC does not specifically state that the use of goods by a
revoking buyer will invalidate his revocation of acceptance. 27 It
does warn the rejecting buyer that "after rejection any exercise of
ownership by the buyer with respect to any commercial unit is
wrongful as against the seller."28 Section 2-608(3) affords rejecting
and revoking buyers similar treatment. It states that the revoking
buyer has the same rights and duties regarding the goods as if he
had rejected them.29 The revoking buyer is thus placed in the same
position as a rejecting buyer; the revoking buyer is treated as if he
had refused to accept the goods due to some nonconformity.
According to section 2-602, an "exercise of ownership" by the
buyer after rejection is "wrongful" and does not constitute accept-
ance.31 Section 2-606 provides further insight about what consti-
tutes acceptance of goods. It states in part: "Acceptance of goods
occurs when the buyer .. .does any act inconsistent with the
seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful as against the seller it
is an acceptance only if ratified by him.",31 If use after rejection is
considered an "exercise of ownership,"'3 2 it is then wrongful as
22. See infra notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 4 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-608.
28. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a).
29. Id.
30. Id.; see id. § 2-606(1)(c).
31. Id. § 2-606(1)(c).
32. See Fecik v. Capindale, 94 Montgomery County L. Rep. 177, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701
(C.P. 1971) (continued use is unquestionably an exercise of ownership). But see Note, Revo-
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against the seller. Any exercise of ownership by one who does not
own the goods, which is what the buyer is claiming through his
revocation, must be inconsistent with the ownership of the individ-
ual who does own the goods, that is, the seller.33 Thus, the buyer's
use after revocation is both wrongful as against the seller and incon-
sistent with the seller's ownership; such use may become an accept-
ance through ratification by the seller.34
The court in Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Division35 appeared to
adopt this approach when it examined a buyer's revocation of ac-
ceptance of an automobile. The court simply listed Code sections 2-
608(3), 2-602(2)(a), and 2-606(1)(c) in a single paragraph and con-
cluded that the Code treats the plaintiffs' continued use of the car
after revocation as an invalidation of their revocation.36
Not all of the courts that have found postrevocation use to be an
invalidation of the revocation-in effect, a second acceptance-have
relied on the combination of the three Code sections cited in Waltz.
Some courts, citing only section 2-602(2)(a), have held that the con-
tinued use is wrongful as against the seller, thus the revocation is
fatally flawed.37 Others have applied section 2-606(l)(c), holding
that postrevocation use is inconsistent with the seller's ownership
and constitutes a reacceptance of the goods. 38 Still other courts
have failed to cite any Code section to explain their invalidation of a
revocation of acceptance . 9 These courts often rely on the mere as-
sertion that a buyer's use of the revoked goods is "inconsistent"
cation Not Barred, supra note 16, at 770 (mere use of property does not constitute an exercise
of ownership).
33. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-2, at 298-99
(1980) (any use is theoretically inconsistent with seller's ownership).
34. U.C.C. § 2-606 comment 4 indicates that subsection (1)(c) is intended to cover the
situation where a buyer who has rejected the goods subsequently takes action inconsistent
with his rejection. The subsection also applies to a revoking buyer who acts inconsistently
with the revocation procedure prescribed in § 2-608(3).
35. 307 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
36. Id. at 816.
37. E.g., Fecik v. Capindale, 94 Montgomery County L. Rep. 177, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701
(C.P. 1971) (buyer lost right of revocation, but attempted revocation served as notification of
a breach of warranty, thus enabling buyer to maintain action for damages); see also Concrete
Equip. Co. v. William A. Smith Contracting Co., 358 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (court
held that defendants were barred from recovery in view of their resumed use of goods, citing
§ 2-602(2)(a)).
38. See, e.g., Wadsworth Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Tollycraft Corp., 277 Or. 433, 560
P.2d 1080 (1977); cf Bowen v. Young, 507 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding use of
mobile home after valid rejection to be acceptance under § 2-606(l)(c)).





While many courts believe that postrevocation use should inval-
idate a revocation of acceptance, there is much disagreement about
which analysis is appropriate. Not only does this inconsistency ex-
ist, but in the last fifteen years courts have employed a variety of
theories to justify, rather than reject, postrevocation use.
B. Buyer's Continued Use of Defective Goods Allowed
1. The Theories
a. Postrevocation Use with Offset to Seller. Some courts have
held that use subsequent to a revocation of acceptance is "wrongful
as against the seller,"4 but does not invalidate the revocation of
acceptance.42 These courts have simply given damages or an offset
to the seller for the buyer's use of the product after revocation.43
Their analysis is apparently limited in scope inasmuch as it only
focuses on section 2-602(2)(a). 4
b. Postrevocation Use Justified by Buyer's Duty to Mitigate
Damages. Courts also have concluded that the revoking buyer is
under a duty to mitigate his damages.4 They base this conclusion
on the rationale that revocation of acceptance, unlike the common
law remedy of rescission, allows recovery for damages as well as
return of the purchase price.46
When mitigation of damages is applied to use after revocation,
40. See, eg., Gigandet v. Third Nat'l Bank, 333 So. 2d 557, 559 (Ala. 1976); Ingle v.
Marked Tree Equip. Co., 244 Ark. 1166, 1174, 428 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1968).
41. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a).
42. See, eg., Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App. 196,
202, 530 P.2d 989, 993 (1975); Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 233 Kan. 1044, 668 P.2d
139 (1983) (by implication inasmuch as court relied on Stroh analysis to support decision).
43. See, eg., Stroh, 35 Colo. App. at 203, 530 P.2d at 994; Johnson, 233 Kan. at 1050-
51, 668 P.2d at 145.
44. Further support for this analysis is found in Note, Revocation Not Barred, supra note
16, at 770:
The language [of § 2-602(2)(a)] is derived from the tort of conversion. But if the
essence of conversion is interference with the owner's control over the goods, then
buyer here was not a converter. It had lawful possession of [the goods]; it never
refused a demand from seller for delivery. . . ; and it never prevented seller from
taking them.
45. See, eg., Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251,
310 A.2d 491 (App. Div.) (buyer properly mitigated damages after revocation by using sew-
ing machines not available elsewhere); cert. denied, 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973); cf
Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) (buyer resumed
use of car after filing suit for rescission because of prohibitive cost of other transportation;
court allowed "revocation" but awarded seller offset for buyer's postrevocation use).
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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the seller must be compensated for the buyer's use. Section 2-
711(1) allows a buyer who justifiably revokes acceptance to "cover"
and to be awarded damages under section 2-712.' 7 Those damages
include "the difference between the cost of cover and the contract
price together with any incidental and consequential damages as
hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in conse-
quence of the seller's breach."48 When the buyer's use of the goods
has saved expenses, his recovery must be reduced, or offset, by the
value of those savings.49
The duty to mitigate ordinarily arises when the buyer seeks con-
sequential damages under section 2-715(2). Consequential damages
resulting from the seller's breach include "any loss ... which
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise."5 Some
courts and commentators believe that the Code's reasonableness
rule51 permits a buyer who cannot obtain substitute goods after he
has revoked to continue to use the nonconforming goods in order to
mitigate his damages. 2 Courts have found further support for this
rationale in the comment to section 2-604, which lists the options
for a revoking buyer. 3 The comment describes the section as al-
lowing "all reasonable leeway to a rightfully rejecting buyer acting
in good faith. The listing of what the buyer may do in the absence
of instructions from the seller is intended to be not exhaustive but
merely illustrative."'5 4 Thus, a revoking buyer may continue using
the goods as long as he can prove that such use mitigated his
damages.
c. Postrevocation Use Justified by Buyer's Need to Preserve Se-
curity Interest in Goods. The Code expressly permits postrevocation
use only when the buyer must use the goods to preserve his security
47. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
48. Id. § 2-712(2) (emphasis added).
49. For a discussion of the problems created by awarding the seller an offset for the
buyer's continued use, see infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text. Although § 2-608 re-
quires revocation of acceptance before "any substantial change in condition of the goods," the
buyer's ability to compensate the seller for use after revocation may obviate the need to pre-
vent later change in the goods. Note, Revocation Not Barred, supra note 16, at 769-70.
50. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
51. See infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
52. Fablok Mills, 125 N.J. Super. at 257-58, 310 A.2d at 494; see Valley Die Cast Corp.
v. A.C.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 181 N.W.2d 303 (1970) (rationale similar to Fablok
Mills); 4 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-711:44 (3d
ed. 1983) (use of the goods permissible to mitigate when commercially reasonable).
53. Fablok Mills, 125 N.J. Super. at 257, 310 A.2d at 494.
54. U.C.C. § 2-604 comment.
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interest in them." Some courts have justified postrevocation use on
this basis,56 and have limited such use to situations where the use
preserves the collateral or its value,57 as the Code prescribes.
Other courts, however, have permitted postrevocation use with-
out demonstrating a need to preserve the collateral or its value,5" in
disregard of the Code's directives. 9
d. Postrevocation Use Justified by Buyer's Duty of Reasonable
Care Under Section 2-602(2)(b). Section 2-602(2)(b) of the Code
instructs the buyer to hold the goods "with reasonable care at the
seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to re-
move them."60 Courts have used this section to justify a buyer's
continued use of goods after revocation.
In Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center, Inc.,"1 the buyers'
decision to remain in the mobile home for six weeks after mailing
their revocation to the seller did not invalidate the revocation.62
The court noted that section 2-602(2)(a) proscribes any exercise of
ownership as wrongful as against the seller, but it did not end its
inquiry with that determination. 63 Rather, the court looked to sec-
tion 1-102(1), which deals with the construction of the Code, and to
section 2-602(2)(b), which discusses a buyer's duty of reasonable
care.6r The court found that the Code requires a liberal construc-
tion in order to promote its underlying purposes and policies.6 5
One of the purposes cited was the modernization of commercial
transaction law.6 6 The court stated that in light of section 2-
602(2)(b), it would follow the "'rule of reasonableness' evident
55. See id. §§ 2-711(3), 9-207(4).
56. E.g., McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 185, 449
N.E.2d 1289, 1293-94 (1983) (alternative holding); Wadsworth Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
Tollycraft Corp., 277 Or. 433, 437, 560 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1977); Jorgensen v. Pressnal, 274
Or. 285, 291-92, 545 P.2d 1382, 1385-86 (1976).
57. E.g., Wadsworth Plumbing & Heating, 277 Or. at 437, 560 P.2d at 1082 (buyer's
continued use of fishing boat after revocation of acceptance held to be a reacceptance under
U.C.C. § 2-606(I)(c) since use was not to preserve collateral).
58. See McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449
N.E.2d 1289 (1983) (buyer does not waive right to revoke acceptance of automobile by con-
tinued use if such use is reasonable).
59. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text; Solove, supra note 16, at 1290-91.
60. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(b).
61. 32 Mich. App. 10, 188 N.W.2d 9 (1971).
62. Id. at 13-14, 188 N.W.2d at 11-12.
63. Id. at 13, 188 N.W.2d at 11.
64. Id. at 13-14, 188 N.W.2d at 11.
65. Id. at 13, 188 N.W.2d at 11.
66. Id.
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throughout the UCC" when interpreting continued use after notice
of revocation. 7 The court concluded that the buyers' continued use
fulfilled the reasonable care requirement of section 2-602(2)(b), not-
ing that the seller did not respond to the buyers' notification nor did
it prove that it was prejudiced by the buyers' delay in vacating the
mobile home.6
e. Postrevocation Use Based on a Reasonableness Principle Not
Founded in the Code. In several recent cases, courts have forth-
rightly endorsed postrevocation use when a consumer buyer's finan-
cial position gives him no choice but to continue to use the defective
goods. 9 Some courts also have taken this approach when the buyer
is a merchant who either cannot obtain substitute goods or is finan-
cially unable to replace the goods until the final disposition of his
lawsuit.7" The issue in such cases is whether continued use of the
goods was reasonable.
These courts rely on several intertwined principles that they find
generally present in the Code. Like the Minsel court, they cite the
Code's rule of reasonableness.7" Moreover, they assert that the
Code's purpose of modernizing commercial law requires stripping
away unnecessary technicalities.7 2 Finally, the Code drafters in-
tended that its provisions be liberally construed, so these courts try
67. Id. at 14, 188 N.W.2d at 11.
68. Id. at 14-15, 188 N.W.2d at 11-12. The Minsel court did not award the seller an
offset for the buyers' continued use, probably because the court considered the continued use
"reasonable care" not "wrongful as against the seller." See id. at 13-14, 188 N.W.2d at 11
(citing U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(a), (b)). Now that courts have begun to allow postrevocation use,
however, failure to award offsets creates further unfairness to sellers. See infra notes 109-33
for a discussion of offset damages.
69. Wallach, supra note 15, at 37; see, e.g., Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor
Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981); McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5
Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (1983).
70. Wallach, supra note 15, at 37; see, e.g., Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc.,
35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580 (1971); Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry
Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405
(1973); see also Distco Laminating, Inc. v. Union Tool Corp., 81 Mich. App. 613, 265
N.W.2d 768 (1978) (buyer's use and alterations of a laminating machine after rejection did
not constitute an acceptance); Valley Die Cast Corp. v. A.C.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 181
N.W.2d 303 (1970) (buyer's continued use of a car wash system after notifying seller of rejec-
tion did not constitute an acceptance).
71. Johannsen, 304 N.W.2d at 658; Fablok Mills, 125 N.J. Super. at 257-58, 310 A.2d at
494-95; McCullough, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 183, 449 N.E.2d at 1292.
72. Johannsen, 304 N.W.2d at 658; see also J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33,
§ 4, at 15-1 6 ("[T he law of commercial transactions [should] be, so far as reasonable, liberal
and nontechnical."); Note, Buyer's Continued Use, supra note 16, at 1383 ("[O]ne of the
purposes of the U.C.C. is to 'de-technicalize' commercial law.").
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to avoid technical distinctions that obstruct reasonable results.73
Thus, these courts examine the reasonableness of the buyer's con-
duct under the circumstances to determine whether the subsequent
use will bar his revocation action.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,' established a five-factor test to determine the rea-
sonableness of postrevocation use. The factors are: (1) Whether
the seller provided the buyer with any instructions regarding care of
the item upon notice of the buyer's revocation, (2) whether the
"buyer's business needs or personal circumstances" compelled the
continued use, (3) whether the seller made assurances during the
period of postrevocation use of cure of the nonconformities or of
other recompense for the buyer's dissatisfaction and inconvenience
caused by the defects, (4) whether the seller acted in good faith,
and (5) whether the seller was "unduly prejudiced by the buyer's
continued use."
75
Unfortunately, the court left several questions about its test un-
answered. It did not establish the necessity or sufficiency of the fac-
tors to justify postrevocation use. It did, however, find that all the
factors supported revocation in the McCullough fact situation.76
2. The Rationale For Permitting Continued Use
The misfortune of the McCullough plaintiff epitomizes the situa-
tion in which courts allow revocation after the buyer's continued
use. The plaintiff, a young clerical worker with limited financial
resources, 77 bought a car and subsequently experienced mechanical
difficulties with it.78 She made numerous attempts to rectify the
problem but without success.79 She then sent a letter to the dealer
who sold her the car. 0 In it she "called for the rescission of the
purchase agreement, demanded a refund of the entire purchase
price and expenses incurred, and offered to return the automobile to
73. See McCullough, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 183, 449 N.E.2d at 1292; Note, Buyer's Continued
Use, supra note 16, at 1383 ("[P]rovisions of the Code should not be interpreted to turn on
technical court-made distinctions.").
74. 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (1983).
75. Id. at 184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293. See also Johannsen, 304 N.W.2d at 658 (similar list
of inquiries for trier of fact).
76. McCullough, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 184-85, 449 N.E.2d at 1294.
77. Id. at 184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293.
78. Id. at 181, 449 N.E.2d at 1291. The dealer had also failed to properly perform some
body work on the car.
79. Id. at 181, 449 N.E.2d at 1291.
80. Id.
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[the dealer] upon receipt of shipping instructions."'" The dealer
failed to respond to the plaintiff's letter. She continued to operate
the car, logging 23,000 miles before the trial began.8 2
In affirming the plaintiff's postrevocation use, the court recog-
nized that the plaintiff had little choice but to continue to operate
the defective car: "A most unreasonable obligation would be im-
posed upon [her] were she to be required, in effect, to secure a loan
to purchase a second car while remaining liable for repayment of
the first car loan."83 The other option that the plaintiff might have
selected seemed equally unrealistic. The Code would have allowed
her to resell the car for the seller's account.84 Under this alterna-
tive, however, a buyer will usually receive a low price due to depre-
ciation of the item. Moreover, if the McCullough buyer had
subsequently lost her revocation case, she would have had no way
to recoup her loss. 85 Even if she were to prevail in her lawsuit, she
would still be unable to afford a replacement car until the seller
repaid her the car's purchase price.86
While the court's solution to Ms. McCullough's problem proba-
bly was well-meant, it is problematic for two reasons. First, the
defendant-dealer, despite his failure to respond to the plaintiff's
problems, bore the entire cost of Ms. McCullough's use of her car
from the time of the notice of revocation until the trial. Second, the
court's approach ignores the Code's dictate that the buyer may not
use a defective good after notifying the seller of revocation of
acceptance.
The McCullough court's approach, as well as the other theories,
represent attempts by the courts to help the revoking buyer who is
constrained by economic exigencies to use the defective good after
revocation. Fairly read, however, the Code prohibits such use.8 7
Moreover, postrevocation use may work an injustice upon the
seller.88 In no way does the prohibition against postrevocation use
leave the buyer remediless; he may still sue for damages. 9
81. Id.
82. Id. at 182, 449 N.E.2d at 1291.
83. Id. at 184, 449 N.E.2d at 1293.
84. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
85. Wallach, supra note 15, at 36-37.
86. Id. at 37.
87. See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 122-28, 138-53 and accompanying text (discussing offset problems).
But see infra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (discussing advantage to seller of giving
offset equivalent to rental value).
89. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
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II. CODE DRAFTERS' INTENT: No USE AFTER REVOCATION
A. Generally
The Code drafters apparently intended that postrevocation use
would invalidate revocation of acceptance. Section 2-608, which
sets out the revocation of acceptance provision, was meant to re-
place sections 69(1)(d), (3), (4), and (5) of the Uniform Sales Act
(USA),9" which codified the common-law remedy of rescission.91
Section 69 of the USA provided a buyer with two options when
there was a "breach of warranty by the seller." 92 The buyer could
refuse to accept the goods,93 which is analogous to the UCC remedy
of rejection,94 or could rescind the contract,95 which is analogous to
the UCC remedy of revocation.96
The USA's broad language included no standard or degree of
breach to explain what was necessary to invoke the two remedies.
The Code drafters abandoned the USA's broad requirements and
crafted a revocation of acceptance provision with a narrow scope.
Under U.C.C. section 2-608, a buyer may revoke his acceptance if
the lot or commercial unit's nonconformity "substantially impairs
its value to him."'9 In drafting the rejection section, on the other
hand, the Code authors established a lower standard. Section 2-601
90. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment (Prior Uniform Statutory Provision).
91. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing operation of rescission). In
the early years of the Code, courts did not use the new term "revocation of acceptance" and
continued to analyze § 2-608 problems in "rescission" terms. E.g., Valley Die Cast Corp. v.
A.C.W., Inc., 25 Mich. App. 321, 181 N.W.2d 303 (1970); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc.,
155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971). Recently, this trend has reversed as the legal commu-
nity has become familiar with the "revocation" language. Eg., Performance Motors, Inc. v.
Allen, 280 N.C. 285, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972).
92. UNIF. SALES Acr § 69(1) (superseded 1951), reprinted in I. MARIASH, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF SALES 780 (1930).
93. UNIF. SALES AcT § 69(1)(c) states:
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election
ici 'Refuse to accept the goods, if the property therein has not passed, and
maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty
94. U.C.C. §§ 2-601, -602.
95. UNIF. SALES AcT § 69(1)(d) states:
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election
(d) *Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive the goods or if
the goods have already been received, return them or offer to return them to
the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which has been paid.
96. U.C.C. § 2-608.
97. For a discussion of the test that the goods be "substantially nonconforming to him,"
see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 8-3, at 305-09 (arguing that "substantially
nonconforming" is the same as "substantially nonconforming to him").
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allows the buyer to reject "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail
in any respect to conform to the contract."98 The UCC authors
could have drafted a revocation section that retained the broad lan-
guage of the USA or even used the expansive phrasing of the Code's
rejection provision, but they chose not to do so. The narrow stan-
dard for the revocation of acceptance section indicates that the
drafters considered revocation to be a restricted remedy.99
The Code authors used a high revocation standard because they
believed that once a buyer has held goods long enough for an ac-
ceptance to occur, he should be able to return the goods to the seller
in only limited circumstances."a° Several policy reasons support
this idea. First, if the buyer has had custody of the goods the defect
may be his fault. a01 The longer the buyer possesses the goods, the
more likely this becomes. 10 2 Also, the goods depreciate while the
buyer is in possession.' Furthermore, the buyer receives an in-
creasing benefit from the goods the longer he is able to use them."°
In sum, "[a]ll of these factors support a rule which makes it difficult
for the buyer who has accepted to throw the goods and the attend-
ant loss from depreciation and market factors back on the seller."'0 5
Allowing postrevocation use would be inconsistent with the
Code drafters' pattern of restricting the revocation of acceptance
remedy. Moreover, the same policies that support a high level of
breach in the revocation of acceptance situation militate against
98. U.C.C. § 2-601. But see Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-the
U.C.C."s "Tarr"-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 52 (1974) (Code does not require perfect tender);
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 8-2, at 296-97 (arguing that the rejection standard
is closer to "substantial nonconformity" than perfect tender).
99. Even though U.C.C. § 2-608 contains further requirements for revocation which are
similar to the requirements of rescission under UNIF. SALES Acr § 69, the standard under
revocation is still higher than that under UNIF. SALES ACr § 69. UNIF. SALES AcT § 69(3)
states:
Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer, he cannot rescind the sale if he
knew of the breach of warranty when he accepted the goods, or if he fails to notify
the seller within a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or if he fails to return
or to offer to return the goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they
were in at the time the property was transferred to the buyer. But if deterioration
or injury of the goods is due to the breach of warranty, such deterioration or injury
shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering to return the goods to the
seller and rescinding the sale.
100. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 8-3, at 301. See also Johnson v. General
Motors Corp., 233 Kan. 1044, 668 P.2d 139 (1983) (buyer's right to reject goods easier to
sustain than revocation of acceptance after buyer has held goods for period of time).







postrevocation use. If a buyer is allowed to continue to use goods
after revocation, he may aggravate the defect that is the basis of his
revocation, depreciate the goods further, and derive additional ben-
efit from them at the expense of the seller.
The Code drafters provided additional evidence that they did
not intend the new remedy of revocation of acceptance to include
continued use of revoked goods in comment 1 to section 2-608.
There the authors noted that "the prior basic policy [of section 69
of the USA] is continued [even though] the section no longer speaks
of 'rescission.' "' The policy behind section 69 of the USA was to
prevent a seller from forcing a buyer to perform a bargain that he
never intended to make."0 7 Under the USA, however, this goal
could be accomplished without allowing continued use of the goods
after the buyer had rescinded the transaction. The USA provided
that the buyer "hold the goods as bailee for the seller" upon the
seller's refusal to accept the buyer's offer to return the goods.
10 8
This imposition of a bailment, which was consistent with the com-
mon-law remedy of rescission, implies that the buyer should only
hold the goods, not use them. 109 Thus, assuming the Code authors
accepted the "prior basic policy" of the USA and yet limited the use
of the remedy by requiring a higher level of breach, it is even more
unlikely they also would have provided for postrevocation use. The
Code authors' restriction of the scope of the USA rescission remedy
when they drafted the revocation of acceptance provision, therefore,
supports the view that the Code does not allow continued use by the
buyer after an attempt to revoke.
B. Exclusive Code Options for the Revoking Buyer
The options for dealing with goods after revocation of accept-
ance that the Code gives the buyer likewise reveal the Code's disap-
106. U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 1.
107. See Williston, Rescission for Breach of Warranty, 16 HARv. L. REv. 465, 472 (1903).
The comment to UNIF. SALES AcT § 69 refers to this article by Samuel Williston, drafter of
the Uniform Sales Act, as embodying the policy of that section. In the article, Williston
wrote about a horse buyer:
He wants to be perfectly sure that he is getting a sound horse, and if the one trans-
ferred to him is not sound, he is as truly forced to perform a bargain which he never
intended to make as is any [buyer] if compelled to perform his part of a contract
when the [seller] is materially in default.
108. Williston, supra note 107, at 472. UNIF. SALE Acr § 69(5).
109. Where the purpose of a bailment excludes any use of the subject matter or any
control or dominion over it other than the physical possession and care, the bailee is regarded
as having mere custody. See Chanock v. United States, 267 F. 612 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Williams
v. State, 165 Ind. 472, 75 N.E. 875 (1905).
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proval of postrevocation use. The Code provides several options for
revoking buyers through the Code sections that set out the steps for
rejecting buyers, inasmuch as section 2-608 places the revoking
buyer in the position of the rejecting buyer. 110 Buyers are classified
into two categories in these sections: buyers without a security in-
terest in the goods because no payment has been made on the
purchase price and buyers with a security interest to the extent that
payments have been made and expenses have been incurred caring
for the goods.111 The Code provides different options for these two
types of buyers.
The buyer without a security interest in the revoked goods is
instructed under section 2-602 to hold the goods "with reasonable
care at the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to permit the
seller to remove them." 112 The buyer has no further obligations
concerning the goods under the section,113 in contrast to the former
requirement under common-law rescission and the USA that the
buyer return or offer to return the goods.1 14 If the seller fails to give
instructions within a reasonable time after being notified of the rev-
ocation, section 2-604 allows the buyer to store the goods for the
seller, reship them to him or resell them for the seller's account.1 15
The Code explicitly states that such action is not an acceptance or a
conversion. 116
The purpose underlying section 2-604 limits what the buyer may
do with respect to goods after revocation of acceptance. He may
take a variety of actions to preserve the goods in order to "reduc[e]
the stake in dispute"'1 17 between the parties as long as he acts in
good faith. Section 2-604 intends that a seller who is forced to take
back goods after proper revocation by the buyer recover as much of
the value of the goods as possible in the form of the goods them-
selves. Thus, it obligates a buyer to take good faith measures to
preserve the goods in the postrevocation period. Inasmuch as use
will almost always decrease the value of the goods, thereby increas-
ing the stake in dispute, use is generally incompatible with the pres-
ervation and salvage objectives of section 2-604. Buyer options
110. See supra text accompanying note 29.
111. U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
112. Id. § 2-602(2)(b).
113. Id. § 2-602(2)(c).
114. UNIF. SALES ACT § 69(1)(d).
115. U.C.C. § 2-604.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 2-604 comment.
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under section 2-604, then, include use only in the extremely rare
case when use would serve the preservation and salvage objectives.
Section 2-711 of the Code grants revoking buyers an express
remedy. It permits them to "cover" and recoup damages under sec-
tion 2-712.118 Thus, the buyer may in good faith make any reason-
able purchase of goods to substitute for those due from the seller,
and may recover the difference between the cost of cover and the
contract price. 119
The Code treats a buyer with a security interest differently from
one without such an interest. A revoking buyer has a security inter-
est in the goods to the extent of payments that have been made and
expenses that have been incurred in caring for the goods.1 20 This
security interest gives the buyer the right to use the goods by appli-
cation of section 9-113 but only in the limited circumstances spelled
out in section 9-207(4). Under section 9-207(4) a secured buyer
"may use or operate the collateral for the purpose of preserving the
collateral or its value." ' Thus, the Code explicitly permits use of
revoked goods only in a very limited and undoubtedly rare instance:
when that use will preserve the goods.
The Code specifies the options for a revoking buyer in consider-
able detail. The fact that use of the goods after revocation was even
mentioned in one section indicates that the drafters considered it an
option for the revoking buyer and felt that it should be severely
limited. Had they intended use to be an option for an unsecured
buyer, it is difficult to understand why they chose not to include it
among the options listed in section 2-604 inasmuch as they did in-
clude it in those sections dealing with a secured buyer. Finally, had
the Code drafters contemplated allowing unlimited use, they would
not have placed such severe restrictions on use by secured buyers
after revocation.
118. U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(a), (b) states in pertinent part:
(1) Where. . .the buyer. . . justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to
any goods involved. . . the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so
may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under [U.C.C. § 2-712] as to all the goods af-
fected. . . or (b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in [U.C.C. § 2-
713J.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 2-711(3).
121. Id. § 9-207(4).
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III. OFFSET PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE COURTS' EXPANSION
OF REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
"An 'offset' may be defined as a claim that serves to counterbal-
ance or to compensate for another claim."122 In cases where use
after notice of revocation has occurred the seller usually is awarded
an offset for the buyer's continued use of the revoked goods. This
amount is then set off against the returned purchase price de-
manded by the buyer.
The Code makes no mention of an offset award, either for use
prior to or subsequent to revocation. The Code's silence concerning
an offset for prerevocation use is probably attributable to its require-
ment that the revocation occur "before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects.' ' 23
A few Code cases, however, have permitted the buyer to revoke the
acceptance after use and have credited the seller with the value of
the buyer's use prior to the revocation. 124 Courts have given the
seller this credit when the buyer, relying on the seller's assurances
and continued attempts to fix the goods, substantially changes the
goods. 25 This approach appears to be consistent with the equitable
theory of restitution which the Code implicitly preserves. 26
An offset for the buyer's continued use has been awarded more
frequently in postrevocation use cases in which use after a revoca-
tion of acceptance was allowed. 27 In making the offset award,
122. Steinmeyer v. Warner Consolidated Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 515, 518, 116 Cal. Rptr.
57, 59-60 (1974) (citing Lalime v. Desbiens, 115 Vt. 165, 168, 55 A.2d 121, 123 (1947); Leo-
nard v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 65 Conn. 529, 537, 33 A. 511, 513 (1895)).
123. U.C.C. § 2-608.
124. See, e.g., Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1972); Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or.
223, 428 P.2d 398 (1967). See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1982). The valuation of offset was
incorporated in the definition of refund, which the statute defines as the "refunding [of] the
actual purchase price (less reasonable depreciation based on actual use where permitted by
rules of the Commission)." Id. § 2301(12). See also Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, § 101(12), 15 U.S.C. § 2301(12) (1982) (Congress re-
quires sellers to allow refunds in some cases as an element of the federal minimum standards
for warranties).
125. Note, Revocation Not Barred, supra note 16, at 766 n.28.
126. U.C.C. § 1-103 states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act,
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions" (em-
phasis added).
127. E.g., Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 115 Ariz. 11, 562 P.2d 1378
(Ct. App. 1977); Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App. 196,
530 P.2d 989 (1975); Jorgensen v. Pressnal, 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (1976). Some courts,
however, have not awarded the seller an offset for the buyer's continued use when such use
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these courts also look to the general principles of equity retained in
the Code under section 1-103.128
A. Offset Based on Rental Cost
Some courts have set the measurement for the offset as the
rental value of the goods for the time they were used by the
buyer. 129 These courts act in harmony with the spirit of revocation,
recognizing that it differs from a damage award for a breach of war-
ranty. In a damage award, the buyer receives the difference be-
tween the values of what was promised and what was delivered.
130
Under revocation, however, the buyer escapes the bargain, and
throws any loss resulting from depreciation of the goods back upon
the seller. 131 When a court calculates the offset with rental costs of
a similar good, it is only allowing depreciation occurring from the
date of receipt of the goods until the date of notice of revocation to
be forced back onto the seller. Depreciation occurring after notice
of revocation is given to the seller is considered part of the rental
cost and is thus paid for by the buyer.
Although rental cost may appear to be the most equitable
method of calculating the seller's offset, it raises several problems.
Revoking acceptance of a car provides an illustration. First, rental
cost calculation has a harsh effect upon the buyer. If the cost of
renting an auto from a retail short-term auto agency is used, a great
deal of the purchase price could be consumed in only a short period
of time. 132 The use of long-term leasing prices appears to be a fairer
basis for offset calculation. 133 It would be inequitable, however, to
allow the lower cost of long-term leasing only if postrevocation use
continued for more than a year. This approach would reward the
buyer whose lawsuit stretched over a long period of time.
Second, the rental cost calculation does not include the buyer's
costs incurred through using a defective automobile. The buyer
was allowed. See, eg., Minsel v. El Rancho Mobile Home Center, Inc., 32 Mich. App. 10,
188 N.W.2d 9 (1971); McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181,
449 N.E.2d 1289 (1983).
128. E.g., Stroh, 35 Colo. App. at 202-03, 530 P.2d at 993-94; Moore v. Howard Pontiac-
Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972); Pedrini v. Mid-City Trailer Depot,
Inc., 1 Wash. App. 56, 60, 459 P.2d 76, 78-79 (1969).
129. E.g., Jorgensen, 274 Or. at 292, 545 P.2d at 1386; Pedrini, 1 Wash. App. at 61, 459
P.2d at 79.
130. U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
131. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 8-1, at 294.
132. Comment, Consumer Revocation of Acceptance of Defective Automobiles--Section 2-
618 [sic] of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 323, 331-32 (1974).
133. Id. at 332.
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may have received the benefit of transportation, but he also was
burdened by the inconvenience of constantly returning the car for
repairs, uncertainty in planning, missing of work, and general an-
noyance. 134 The Restatement of Restitution allows the application
of this countersetoff, 13' and the Code provides incidental and conse-
quential damages to a revoking buyer in section 2-715. Unfortu-
nately, cases allowing the seller rental value as an offset for
continued use usually include no discussion of section 2-715 and fail
to take into account these buyer inconveniences.
136
Finally, the main rationale behind allowing continued use after
revocation is to make the remedy of revocation of acceptance avail-
able to the buyer of average means who cannot afford to store, re-
ship, or resell the goods. 137 If a court chooses to award the seller a
rental cost offset, the buyer's remedy will be inequitably minimized.
B. Offset Based on the Value of Reasonable Use
To prevent such unfairness to the buyer, other courts have taken
a different approach when awarding an offset to the seller. Instead
of restoring to the seller the value he lost by the continued use and
depreciation of the goods, the court charges the buyer for the bene-
fit he received by such use.1 38 However, such an award may be less
than satisfactory to the seller for several reasons. In many cases the
use value of the defective goods to the buyer may be trifling or non-
existent.1 39 Generally, the use value will not equal the further de-
cline in the goods' overall value due to depreciation after notice of
the revocation was given. The buyer thus pushes this additional
loss back on the seller.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., discussed the issue of compensating the seller for the
134. Id. at 331.
135. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 157, 159 (1936).
136. Comment, supra note 132, at 331. See also Pedrini v. Mid-City Trailer Depot, Inc.,
I Wash. App. 56, 459 P.2d 76 (1969) (seller is entitled to reasonable rental cost of mobile
home from buyer who received beneficial use).
137. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
138. Stroh v. American Recreation & Mobile Home Corp., 35 Colo. App. 196, 530 P.2d
989 (1975) ("fair and reasonable use value"); Lawrence v. Modem Mobile Homes, Inc., 562
S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("reasonable value of continued use"); Moore v. Howard
Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972) ("fair and reasonable use value of
the automobile for the time the [buyers] made use of the automobile based upon the condition
of this particular automobile").
139. Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 75 CoM. L.J. 354, 357
(1970).
140. 233 Kan. 1044, 668 P.2d 139 (1983).
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buyer's continued use. It concluded that "[t]he proper set-off is the
value of use of the goods received by the buyer after revocation of
acceptance."'141 The court believed that this result followed from
the purpose of allowing revocation after acceptance: "to restore the
buyer to the economic position the buyer would have been in if the
goods were never delivered." 142
The Johnson case involved the revocation of a truck purchased
for $11,119.65. The truck had been driven for two months and for
1,700 miles before notice of revocation was given. The buyer drove
the truck an additional sixteen months before the case was tried.1 43
The revocation was held valid, and the only issue on appeal was the
validity of the offset awarded to the seller for the buyer's postrevo-
cation use.144
The trial court had adopted a depreciation method presented by
a General Motors expert witness for calculating the offset award. 145
The witness had testified that an identical vehicle leased for a term
of 18 to 24 months depreciates at a rate of 2.75% per month.1 46
The trial court used this figure to arrive at an offset of $4,702.94
which was 42% of the original purchase price.147 Thus, when an
offset method includes a depreciation factor, the buyer suffers hard-
ship while the seller is compensated for the buyer's postrevocation
use of the goods.
The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected the trial court's calcula-
tion because it allowed the seller "to recover a setoff based upon a
period of time from the seller's refusal to accept back defective
goods until there is a judicial determination that the seller was
wrong not to accept the buyer's revocation of acceptance."' 148 The
Court instead relied on a Federal Highway Administration booklet
entitled "Cost of Owning and Operating Automobiles and Vans
1982" as its basis of calculation. 49 The booklet indicated that the
value the plaintiff received from the use of the truck was 10.7 cents
a mile.150 Since the plaintiff had driven the truck 14,619 miles after
141. Id. at 1052, 668 P.2d at 146.
142. Id. at 1051, 668 P.2d at 145 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 1052, 668 P.2d at 145-46.
144. Id. at 1046, 668 P.2d at 142.
145. Id. at 1051, 668 P.2d at 145.
146. This figure excluded all costs of operation, maintenance, lessors return on capital,
insurance and other expenses to obtain pure depreciation. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1052, 668 P.2d at 146.
149. Id.
150. The booklet stated that the cost of owning and operating a vehicle similar to the
truck purchased by the buyers was 33.2 cents per mile. "After deduction of maintenance, gas
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giving notice of revocation, the correct offset was calculated to be
$1,565.23, which was 14% of the original purchase price. 151
The result of this lower offset is to burden the seller by the de-
preciation cost of use after notice of revocation. Courts have justi-
fied this result on the grounds that the seller could have avoided
further depreciation of the goods simply by accepting the buyer's
revocation.152 This is an inadequate rationalization for such an in-
equitable result.
The delay between the notice of revocation of acceptance and
the final judicial decision of whether the revocation is valid or not
creates the need to calculate offset. In a perfect judicial system, the
validity of the revocation of acceptance would be known the day of
the notice. However, there is usually a considerable amount of time
between the filing of a lawsuit and its final disposition. Should the
seller refuse to take back the goods upon the buyer's attempted rev-
ocation, the buyer may be burdened with nonconforming goods for
a considerable period of time. Admittedly, the buyer's decision
whether to use the defective item after revocation is difficult, espe-
cially when it is a necessary consumer good for which payments are
due. The seller, however, should have the right to challenge the
revocation of acceptance. It is not fair to place the burden of con-
tinued use on him simply because of the buyer's difficult financial
position.
Thus, while a reasonable use offset based on the method used by
the Johnson court allows the buyer to escape a bad bargain, it places
all the resulting burden on the seller. The seller pays all deprecia-
tion costs of the goods occurring from the time of his receipt of
notice from the buyer until the final disposition of the case. The
Code authors did not allow for continued use after revocation-
even if they had, the remedy of revocation was obviously not in-
tended to allow the buyer to revoke and then to continue to use the
depreciating goods without having to pay for them.
This dilemma over the calculation of offset is another indication
that the Code authors did not intend to permit postrevocation use.
The courts that allow such use imply that buyers would be remedi-
less otherwise. These courts, however, have failed to consider sec-
and oil, parking and tolls, insurance and state and federal taxes, expenses the buyers have
already paid, the booklet concluded the original vehicle cost to operate is 10.7 cents per
mile." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1052, 668 P.2d at 145-46; McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 185, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 1293 (1983).
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tior 2-714 of the Code, entitled "Buyer's Damages for Breach in
Regard to Accepted Goods."
153
IV. DAMAGES-AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY WHERE
POSTREVOCATION USE HAS OCCURRED
Section 2-711(1)(a) damages for revoked goods and section 2-
714 damages for accepted goods are merely alternative benefit-of-
the-bargain measures. 54 A buyer, bound to his acceptance because
his continued use made his revocation of acceptance ineffective,
may still pursue damages for breach of contract under section 2-
714.155 While revocation enables the buyer to escape the bargain
and throw resulting depreciation back on the seller, a damage
award will give the buyer the difference between the values of what
was promised and what was delivered. Although the buyer must
retain possession of the goods, he is compensated for what he did
not receive. The Code authors have provided this alternative rem-
edy and it should be employed when a buyer has continued to use
goods after he has revoked acceptance.
In Jones v. Abriani,56 the plaintiff-buyers sued for rescission 57
of a mobile home yet continued to use it "for a substantial length of
time."' 58 The trial court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and
punitive damages, and the defendants appealed. 5 9 The court of ap-
153. U.C.C. § 2-714 states:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender
the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next
section may also be recovered.
154. Note, Revocation Not Barred, supra note 16, at 771 n.54.
155. Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Mach. & Foundry Co., 125 N.J. Super. 251, 259, 310
A.2d 491, 495 (App. Div.), cert denied, 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973); Fecik v.
Capindale, 94 Montgomery County L. Rep. 177, 182, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701, 708 (C.P. 1971).
A buyer may be precluded from recovering damages if he neglected to plead them as an
alternative remedy. Eg., Villarreal v. Boggus Motor Co., 471 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1971).
156. 169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976).
157. It was not clear whether the buyer's complaint requesting rescission rested on the
theory of rejection under U.C.C. § 2-601 or revocation of acceptance under § 2-608. Id. at
567, 350 N.E.2d at 643.
158. Id. at 573, 350 N.E.2d at 646. No specific dates were given so it is impossible to
determine how long they lived in the home before trial.
159. Id. at 560, 350 N.E.2d at 639.
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peals upheld the damage award even though it believed postrevoca-
tion use is allowed under the Code. The court wrote:
While rejection or revocation of acceptance is available to the
plaintiffs in this case, we cannot say that those are the only rea-
sonable remedies for such a wrong. Where the plaintiffs have
wrongfully used an item for a substantial length of time after a
valid rejection or revocation of acceptance has taken place, as in
the case at bar, it may be appropriate for the trial court to let the
parties accept the goods and then receive damages for the cost of
repairs, rather than rescinding the contract.1 60
The plaintiffs in the case were awarded compensatory damages suf-
ficient to repair all the defects in the trailer.161 Thus the buyers
eventually received what they bargained for-a mobile home with-
out defects. The trial court's damages-only approach obviated the
need to rationalize postrevocation use and to calculate an offset
award for the seller. Consequently, the most reasonable approach
when postrevocation use is involved is for courts to require the
buyer to use his alternative benefit-of-the-bargain remedy.
An examination of the ludicrous result that is possible in a case
like Fablok Mills, Inc. v. Cocker Machine & Foundry Co. lends fur-
ther support to this approach.162 In that case, a New Jersey appeals
court reversed the trial judge's ruling that continued use of defective
knitting machines by the plaintiff, a fabric manufacturer, invali-
dated its revocation of acceptance. The appeals court allowed the
plaintiff to revoke its acceptance of the machines 163 even though it
had used them until they had no value." 6 In a situation like that in
Fablok Mills, the plaintiff will likely recover the same amount under
either the damage remedy or the remedy of revocation of accept-
ance if rental cost is used to calculate the offset for the seller.' 65
160. Id. at 573-74, 350 N.E.2d at 646 (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 575, 350 N.E.2d at 647.
162. 125 N.J. Super. 251, 310 A.2d 491 (App. Div. 1973), rev'g 120 N.J. Super. 350, 294
A.2d 26 (Law Div. 1972), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 317, 315 A.2d 405 (1973).
163. The plaintiff was only allowed to revoke acceptance of 6 of the 10 machines in-
volved, because it missed the statute of limitations on the first 4. Id. at 262, 310 A.2d at 497.
164. "The buyer depreciated the machines for tax purposes over an estimated useful life
of eight years using the double declining-balance method." Note, Revocation Not Barred,
supra note 16, at 772 n.55 (citing Appendix of Defendant-Respondent at Da1-Da72, Fablok
Mills).
165.
If it is assumed (1) that the contract price is evidence of the value of the promised
goods, (2) that the cost of cover is zero, and (3) that the rental value of the defective
machines over the seven-to-eight-year period that buyer used them is equivalent to
the value of the delivered goods, then upon buyer's proving seller's breach, its re-
covery under either measure would be the same.
Id. at 772 n.56.
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Since the result is the same or very similar regardless of which rem-
edy is used, it appears foolish for courts to apply a strained analysis
in an attempt to make postrevocation use appear to be permitted by
the Code.
In most instances of postrevocation use a damage award will
adequately compensate the buyer for the seller's breach. 166 The
buyer will not be able to push depreciation back on the seller or
completely escape the bargain he has made since his continued use
denies him the right to use the remedy of revocation. Thus, a dam-
age remedy in such a situation is the only one completely fair to all
the parties involved.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have recently begun to rationalize postrevocation use
under the Code. 167 They have done so in an effort to make the rem-
edy of revocation of acceptance available to consumer-buyers who
lack the financial means to follow the Code's express options for the
treatment of revoked goods.
At first glance, application of the remedy of revocation of ac-
ceptance in cases involving postrevocation use appears fair, espe-
cially when consumer-buyers are involved. On closer examination,
however, it is inequitable to either the buyer or the seller depending
on how it is applied. While the remedy allows the buyer to continue
to use the defective goods after notice of his revocation, such use
can subject him to an outrageous offset against his returned
purchase price if the court calculates this award using the rental
cost principle.1 61 If the court uses a reasonable use value in calcu-
lating the offset award, however, the buyer is in a better position but
the seller is treated inequitably. 169 He is made to bear the cost of
the buyer's continued depreciation of the goods after his notice of
revocation. Thus, either application of the remedy is unacceptable.
Courts faced with a buyer's postrevocation use should avoid us-
ing the remedy of revocation of acceptance. They should instead
apply the benefit-of-the-bargain damage remedy. This approach en-
ables the buyer to recover money damages sufficient to repair the
166. Damages may fail to be an adequate compensation if the item is a "lemon" that has
no single irreparable defect, but rather a succession of major and minor problems. See Note,
Buyer's Right to Revoke Acceptance Against the Automobile Manufacturer for Breach of Its
Continuing Warranty of Repair and Replacement, 7 GA. L. Rlv. 711 (1973).
167. See supra notes 41-76 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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goods and bring them into conformity with what the seller prom-
ised to deliver. By consistently using a damage theory, courts will
regain sight of the Code's goal of uniformity in commercial law 170
and avoid the inequitable results that the remedy of postrevocation
use now allows.
PATRICIA J. HRUBY
170. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
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